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RELEVANT STATUTES/RULES 
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Time 
(d) Notice of hearings. Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the 
time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order 
of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Relief from Order 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Divorce Decree Upon Affidavit 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing in cases in 
which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after service of process or 
other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the withdrawal of the answer, or 
stipulates to the entry of the decree or entry of default. An affidavit in support of the 
decree shall accompany the application. The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to 
support necessary findings of fact and a final judgment. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: Record on Appeal 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial 
transcript is ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of 
the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request shall 
be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. 
Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk 
of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, 
appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within the request for 
transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period 
the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a 
copy with the clerk of the appellate court. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: Briefs 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: Award of Costs 
a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, 
costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or 
ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against 
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or 
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: Award of Costs 
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, 
costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or 
ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against 
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or 
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Serving and Filing Pleadings and 
Other Papers: 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order 
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint 
unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to 
discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every 
written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, 
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar 
paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be made on parties in 
default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for 
relief against them shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of 
summons in Rule 4. 
ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner began by stating he would address only two issues: (1) whether the 
trial court's sanction of default judgment was proper, and (2) whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default Decree of Divorce. However, the 
Petitioner then raised three additional issues under his Argument and Conclusion: (1) that 
the Respondent has not marshaled the evidence; (2) that the Respondent's Exhibit UG" 
should be stricken; and (3) that the Petitioner should receive costs of the appeal. While 
the Petitioner enumerated only one of these three additional issues under its own heading, 
the Respondent has for clarity enumerated each of the issues Petitioner raised in his Brief 
of Appellee under their own headings below. 
1. "AS A THRESHOLD MATTER RESPONDENT HAS NOT MARSHALED 
THE EVIDENCE" 
Petitioner argues that the Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence upon 
which the trial court based its findings of fact (Brief of Appellee, p. 8). An appellant who 
wishes to challenge a court's findings of facts has the duty to "marshal the evidence 
supporting a court's finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below" 
Utah R. of App. P. 24(a)(9); Reidv. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted). This duty underscores the important policies of efficiency and 
fairness as well as the broad discretion a trial court is given regarding its findings of fact 
{James v. Hunt, 2005 WL 2671300 %[ (Utah Ct. App) (citation omitted; memorandum 
decision); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
1 
However. Ill is t'oml requires the cor < to exercise its discretion based on 
"adequate findings of fact" and on a correct application of the law (Lund v.Brown, P.3d 
277, 279 (Utah 2000). Should it fail to do so the appellant is relieved of her duty to 
marshal the evidence pertaining to those findings. (Woodward v. Fazzio 823 P.2d 474, 
477-478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (an appellant is not required .to "gothroi - futile 
marshaling exercise" where the trial court's findings of fact are "so inadequate that they 
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations") and is allowed to "simply 
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed," Woodward at 477. 
Findings that do not "appear to be complete" and are not "sufficiently detailed" Id. 
for this Court to "determine whether the evidence adduced at trial (or in this case in 
Respondent's 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce) supports the trial court's 
findings" are not sufficient findings. (Id), (citations omitted) (emphasis and parenthetical 
added); Utah R. App. P (60(b). Findings are only "sufficiently detailed" where they 
include eriough detail and "subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they 
are grounded." Id. They must also be "adequate to show that the court's judgmeiit decree 
follows logically from and is supported by the evidence." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. V. 
Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 43 (I Jtah 2003) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987). 
The Respondent brought this case on appeal due to the trial court's inadequate 
findings of fact and erroneous application of law pertaining to its denial of Respondent's 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Decree of Dh orce (1 lereafter "Ri ilc 60(b) Motion") 
among other grounds (Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b; See also Brief of Apellant (hereafter "Brief," 
pp. 24,& fn4, 49-50).The trial court issued the default decree of divorce against the 
Respondent at an Evidentiary Hearing as a sanction for her failure to produce evidence by 
the date the court ordered her to do so and apparently for her failure to appear at the 
hearing.1 The Respondent set forth five different grounds for the court to set aside the 
default judgment against her that were relevant to her failure to produce discovery and to 
attend the hearing. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Set Aside Decree of Divorce (hereafter "Respondent's Memorandum"), R. 153-195. 
In its Ruling regarding Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion the trial court's main 
finding was that Respondent had "adequate notice of the June 4, 2004 Evidentiary 
Hearing and simply chose not to appear." {See Ruling, R 247-248; see also Brief of 
Appellant (hereafter "Brief) Exhibit "F"). It based this finding upon two subsidiary 
findings: (1) that Respondent's claim that she received no notice of the June 4, 2004 
scheduling conference was not credible and (2) that Respondent's claim that the parties 
had entered a stipulation and thus settled the case before the Evidentiary Hearing was not 
credible. Id. The court may also have addressed the Respondent's claim on ineffective 
counsel by reference. 
1
 While the trial court issued the default Decree of Divorce as a sanction for failing to 
produce discovery, its Ruling denying Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion directly 
addressed only receipt of notice and her failure to attend the hearing. See Ruling, R. 248; 
Motion for Default and Evidentiary Hearing, FL.83-86; Respondent's Memorandum, R. 
192-193. 
3 
A Evidence The Trial Court Used To Support II 1 Hiding Regarding 
Respondent's Claim Of No Notice. 
Evidence the trial court used to support its finding that the Respondent received 
notice2 was (1) the undisputed fact that Respondent attended the June 4th scheduling 
conference unrepresented by counsel3 (See Ruling, R. 247-248; Respondent's 
Memorandum, R 158 f^ 25 26, 29, 32) and (2) all notices sent pertaining to discovery and 
the Evidentiary Hearing were addressed to the Respondent at the same address as they 
were prior to the scheduling conference (Ruling, R. 247-248).4 The court apparently 
reasoned that because Respondent shun \ d y it the scheduling conference she must have 
received notice of it as addressed or as certified to have been addressed, and because the 
notice sent of the Motion for Default Decree of Divorce and Evidentiary Hearing was 
held after the scheduling conference and sent to the same address at which the trial court 
determined that the Respondent received notice of the scheduling conference, the 
Respondent received notice of the Evidentiary Hearing as well. 
The court stated that it had reviewed Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion, Supporting 
Memorandum, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition and its supporting affidavits and 
while it does not state such, likely also based its decision on the Affidavit of Katrina 
Respondent maintains she was unaware of receiving notice. See Respondent's 
Memorandum, R. 160 f 44; see also Brief, p. 27 fn 9 
Respondent's appearance was by telephone. R.78 
4
 Notice of the scheduling conference was sent to Respondent at 873 East 200 South, 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 (R. 72). Certificate of Service of Discovery Requests (R.76-
77), Scheduling Order (R.78-80), Default Certificate(R. 82), Motion for Default and 
Evidentiary Hearing (R. 83-86), Request to Submit for Decision, (R. 87-89), Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing (R. 93-94) were all certified as having been sent to the same address. 
Lyon, legal secretary of Petitioner's counsel who swore that she sent out notices to the 
address as stated and also that two days before the Evidentiary Hearing the Respondent 
called opposing counsel's office asking ccwhat the notice she received about an 
evidentiary hearing was all about." 
B. Evidence The Trial Court Used To Support Its Finding Regarding 
Stipulation. 
Evidence the trial court used to support its finding regarding stipulation was the 
fact that Respondent did not show up at the Evidentiary Hearing with stipulation in hand 
(Ruling at R 247, see also Minutes of Evidentiary Hearing, R. 92 (Respondent not 
present); Brief, Exhibit "F") and likely, though not specifically stated, the Petitioner's 
sworn statement in his supporting affidavit that he and his counsel sent several 
stipulations to the Respondent but "could not get her to be reasonable" (See Ruling, R. 
227 f 13). The court apparently reasoned that if the parties had really reached an 
agreement there would be a signed stipulation; if there was a signed stipulation the 
Respondent would have a copy of it; and if she had a copy of the stipulation the 
Respondent would have brought it to the Evidentiary Hearing. 
C. Evidence The Court Used To Support Two Possible Findings-By-
Reference. 
The court may have also addressed by reference ineffective assistance of counsel 
and Respondent's lack of understanding regarding the nature of the Evidentiary Hearing 
and the importance of attending. The Court states in its Ruling that it "is still of the 
opinion, as originally expressed it its December 7, 2004 Ruling on Respondent's 
5 
Objectioi i to Petitioner's Proposed I ;ii icili lgs of 1 'act & Conch ision of I .aw and Decree of 
Divorce (hereafter "Ruling on Respondent's Objection"), that the Respondent had 
adequate notice and chose not to appear and not to have counsel present." (Ruling, R. 
248). In that Ruling the court addressed Respondent's claims that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that she did not understand the nature of the Evidentiary 
Hearing and importance of attending (Ruling on Respondent's Objection, R. 119-21 fflf 2, 
3). The court found that because Respondent's former counsel withdrew in April 20, 
2004, his ineffectiveness could not have affected Respondent's "simple failure to respond 
to pleadings and to show up at hearings" {Id. at R. 119-21 f 2) and made no finding of 
facts pertaining to Respondent's failure to understand the nature of an Evidentiary 
Hearing {Id. at R. 119-211] 3). 
E. The Trial Court's Rulings Were Factually Inadequate and Legally 
Insufficient. 
Regarding all other claims and evidence, the trial court does not make any 
reference nor make any finding of facts regarding them in its Vpi il 22, 2005 Ruling {See 
Brief, pp. 35-37). Even in the light most favorable to the trial court the court's findings 
regarding Respondent's claims of due process violation and mistake and excusable 
neglect were woefully inadequate. First, even though \ t 's finding of fact 
regarding notice may have been "sufficiently detailed" to disclose the evidentiary basis of 
the court's finding regarding whether notice was sent and received, it is legally 
insufficient in that the court has completely misplaced whether notice was sent and 
received as "the primary factual dispute" in this case. Respondent's claim that she die1 not 
receive notice was only one part of the evidence Respondent used to support one of her 
claims—mistake and excusable neglect (See Brief of Appellate, pp. 38-43). It simply had 
no relationship to Respondent's other four claims of error, including violation of due 
process (See Brief, pp. 25-30, 35-37; Respondent's Memorandum, R 166,168). 
Further, the court did not even come close to addressing the evidence offered by 
the Respondent regarding her due process claim, which is that she did not receive timely 
notice 5 (See Respondent's Memorandum, R. 164-66). The court also failed to address the 
issue of whether Respondent was aware of notice under mistake and excusable neglect6 
and failed to address any of the other bases of her claim of mistake and excusable 
neglect. Moreover, the court did not mention any findings of fact at all in its Ruling on 
Respondent's claims regarding Petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentations at the 
Evidentiary Hearing. (See Ruling, R. 247-248). 
The court's reference to its Ruling on Respondent's Objection should not be 
construed to mean he made findings in his Ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel and 
regarding Respondent's lack of understanding (again just one piece of evidence 
Respondent offered in support of Mistake and Excusable Neglect) because the court 
never specifically mentions them. Yet right after stating it had reviewed its Ruling on 
5
 For Respondent's more detailed discussion of this see Brief 26-27. 
6
 The court did not address notice at all in the framework of Mistake and Excusable 
Neglect. The court effectively collapsed the Respondent's claim of violation of due 
process because of untimely notice as well as her claim of Mistake and Excusable 
Neglect into its finding that she received actual notice 
7
 See also Respondent's Argument concerning the trial court's failure to address her 
claim in her Brief, 36-37; 39, fn 30. 
7 
Respondent's Objection the court quoted verbatim its other finding there that Respondent 
included in its Rule 60(b) Motion regarding adequate notice (Ruling on Respondent's 
Objection, R. 119-21 f l ; Ruling at R.248). Even if the court's reference to its Ruling on 
Respondent's Objection is construed to mean it made findings regarding Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel and Respondent's lack of understanding, those findings are also 
inadequate. The court's finding on ineffective assistance is not based upon evidence 
regarding how former counsel's ineffective assistance might have affected Respondent 
even after he resigned as her counsel but rather upon the assumption that the effect of 
ineffective assistance could not have affected the Respondent after he resigned. Further, 
the court's dismissal of Respondent's lack of understanding with the comment that she 
should have come to the court for help presupposes she felt confident she could do so and 
understand the judge better than she could understand the legal documents before her. 
Thus none of the above findings or lack thereof "appear to be complete" or are 
sufficiently detailed to "show that the court's judgment decree follows logically from and 
is supported by the evidence." Rather, the court's Ruling leaves so many holes that its 
findings "cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations" and the 
Respondent is thereby released from a "futile exercise" of attempting marshal the 
evidence regarding it. 
Finally, the trial court's finding of fact pertaining to Respondent's claim that the 
Petitioner fraudulently misrepresented his intent to enter a stipulation is conclusory and 
based entirely upon flawed logic, presupposing the very conclusion to which it leads. The 
trial court concluded that there was no stipulated agreement because the Respondent did 
not show up at the hearing with the stipulation. It never addresses the claim Respondent 
set forth in her Rule 60(b) Motion that the Petitioner fraudulently misrepresented his 
intent to enter the stipulation in order to obtain a default judgment against the Respondent 
(R. 169, 170). Instead the trial court based the premises upon which it reached its finding 
regarding a stipulation on the presupposition that the Petitioner did not misrepresent his 
intent and thus there was no fraud. 
However, according to Respondent's claim she could not have brought a copy of 
the signed stipulation because she did not have one due to Petitioner's fraudulent 
misrepresentations and conduct. (See Respondent's Memorandum, R. 159-160 ff 33, 34, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46.) Thus the trial court's finding pertaining to fraudulent 
misrepresentation of intent "cannot be meaningfully challenged as a factual 
determination" and Respondent is under no obligation to attempt to marshal evidence 
regarding it. 
2. "THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPER" 
Petitioner argues that the trial court's issuance of a default judgment was not too 
harsh a remedy based on Coxey v. Foe (Brief of Appellee, p. 9 (citing Coxey v. Foe, Arie 
No. 2742 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005)).8 Petitioner's argument reveals that Petitioner 
misunderstands the scope of this appeal. 
Though Petitioner's Brief of Appelle was not paginated, references to page numbers in 
the Brief begins at "Jurisdiction" page 4. 
9 
This Court has directed that the scope of an appeal based on the trial court's denial 
of a Rule 60(b) Motion is limited to "addressing] only the propriety of denial or grant of 
relief Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000) {see also Brief, p. 23). Here it is undisputed that (1) all claims of error by 
Respondent that are before this Court on appeal originate from the trial court's denial of 
the Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion {see Brief, p. 22; Brief of Appellee, p. 4) and (2) 
Respondent's motion to set aside that the trial court denied was a Rule 60(b) Motion {see 
Brief, p. 22; Brief of Appellee p. 7).Therefore this Court's review is limited to the issue 
of whether it was proper in light of the evidence Respondent presented supporting five 
different claims of error, including two different claims of fraud, for the trial court to 
deny Respondent's 60(b) Rule 60(b) Motion. 
However Petitioner correctly identified whether default judgment was too harsh a 
remedy as an important factor for the trial court to have considered before it denied 
Respondent relief, in light of the extenuating circumstances leading up to the grant of 
default as set forth in Respondent's 60(b) motion. Instead the trial court denied 
Respondent's 60(b) Motion while failing to address Respondent's reasons and supporting 
evidence as framed (R. 247-248). The relevant issue before this Court on appeal is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to do so. See Brief, p. 23. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Petitioner argues that there was sufficient due process to issue a divorce decree 
and that the "alleged fraud, mistake, excusable neglect limited findings of fact, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth by the Respondent do not justify relief." See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 14. 
A. There Was Sufficient Due Process To Issue A Default Divorce 
Decree. 
The Petitioner states that Respondent argues the standard of review for the trial 
court's holding regarding due process is "abuse of discretion." However, the Respondent 
has pointed out that the standard of review for the court's denial of her 60(b) motion 
under due process is correction of error. See Brief p. 1. 
Respondent agrees with Petitioner that whether a party was actually served notice 
of an upcoming hearing is indeed a due process issue. However, as noted above that issue 
is irrelevant to due process in this case because it is not the due process issue Respondent 
put before the trial court under Rule 60(b)(6), and therefore not the due process issue now 
before this Court on appeal.9 Rather, the issue before this court is whether the trial court 
erred by failing to consider Respondent's argument that the notice it sent her of the 
Evidentiary Hearing violated her due process rights because it did not provide the 
requisite five day notice under Rule 6(d) (Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d)).10 Petitioner's persistence 
in claiming that the issue before this Court is whether the trial court sent and Respondent 
received actual notice is tantamount to suggesting that this Court adopt a new rule that 
trial courts may discard Rule 6(d)'s minimum five-day notice requirement in a due 
9
 The Court of Appeals is limited to "addressing] only the propriety of denial or grant of 
relief in an appeal of the trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion. See Infra at 7. 
10
 See Brief at 26-30. 
11 
process claim of error so long as they believe that notice of hearing was sent and received 
at any time prior to the Evidentiary Hearing. 
Moreover, Petitioner improperly uses the separate issues of whether notice was 
timely and whether notice was sent interchangeably,11 as if to try and convince this Court 
that whether notice was actually sent is exactly the same issue as when notice was sent. 
As Respondent has stated in her Brief, it is well established that due process affords 
Respondent the right to have received notice in a timely manner, independent of whether 
notice of the Evidentiary Hearing was actually sent. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 26-30; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d). 
Petitioner next claims that Respondent was not entitled to notice of the hearing at 
all under Rule 104 inasmuch as Respondent was in default at the time notice was sent. 
Therefore, Petitioner contends, the issue of whether notice was defective is irrelevant 
(Brief of Appellee p. 11). This would be true if Rule 104 were applicable to this case. 
However, there is not the remotest match between the conditions of default that would 
make Rule 104 apply and the facts surrounding the default entered against Respondent in 
this case.12 Rule 104 states in its entirety: 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing 
in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after 
Petitioner states that "If the trial court committed error by not providing any notice to 
her of the evidentiary hearing... " (Brief 11 f 3) and that "she has not explained how she 
was harmed by the alleged failure to receive notice of the hearing..." (Id. at 12 f 1) and 
then "Further, if Appellant Respondent Peterson truly felt that the trial court issued the 
entry of default Without proper notice " (Id. at 12 |2)(emphasis added). 
12
 For Respondent's discussion of this in her Brief, see Brief at 34-35. 
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to 
the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or 
entry of default. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 104. (emphasis added). 
The default decree of divorce issued against Respondent was done at Petitioner's 
request as a sanction for Respondent's failure to make a timely response to Petitioner's 
discovery requests. (Motion for Default & Evidentiary Hearing, at R. 85; Brief of 
Appellee at 6, 9) Petitioner did not apply for a default judgment under, nor could it have 
been properly granted pursuant to, Rule 104 in that Respondent made a timely 
appearance after service of process (R. 36-39), and nowhere in the record does it show 
that Respondent waived notice or stipulated to the withdrawal of the answer, the entry of 
the decree, or the entry of the default. (See Index of Record On Appeal; Record on 
Appeal; R. 30-33). Further, Petitioner has not claimed that any such stipulation or waiver 
occurred. See Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 3 (Petitioner skips over the conditions 
under which Rule 104 applies in a default case altogether, stating "the facts are clear—a 
default certificate had been issued. Thus, there was no need for the hearing at all); Brief 
of Appellee, pp. 6, 9. 
The Lund Court's interpretation of Rule 5 "mirrors" that of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 5(a) which"requires service of papers and pleadings on each party not in 
default for failure to appear. Thus, by appearing at any time in the action, a party 
becomes entitled to have his attorney notified of all subsequent proceedings and receive 
copies of all papers, even if he later chooses to default;" see New York Life Lns. Co. v. 
Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir 1966) (stating that defendant's appearance entitled him 
to service of all [papers, including the summary judgment motion made and granted after 
defendant had been defaulted." Lund, supra, at 282. 
13 
Undeterred by Rule 104's obvious inapplicability Petitioner nonetheless hopes to 
find a way to make it fit. Thus he argues for this Court to go against Rule 104's plain 
meaning and adopt a new rule of statutory construction: (1) ignore the clear face of the 
rule if it doesn't "exactly" apply, (2) extract a broad principle from it and (3) use that 
broad principle to construct a new rule of law independent of the Legislature's obvious 
intent. However, this Court has made it clear regarding statutory interpretation that it 
looks first "to the plain language of the statute" and that only upon a finding of ambiguity 
there does it "seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 2-4 (Utah 1996). Rule 104's language is 
unambiguous about conditions under which no hearing is required for a default judgment. 
Therefore this Court should not go beyond its text. 
Petitioner argues that even if the hearing were required, the error14 was somehow 
"cured" by Respondent's "subsequent objections, response, and reply" before the judge 
issued the Decree of Divorce (Brief of Appellee 11-12). Oddly, Petitioner reasons that 
because "all that was discussed at the trial [for which insufficient notice was sent] was 
evidence," and because Respondent subsequently filed a timely "Objection to Petitioner's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce" and replied 
to Petitioner's response, Respondent was somehow "heard just as much as if she had 
14
 Once again the "error" to which Petitioner erroneously refers is whether the trial court 
incorrectly ruled that notice was mailed and she should have received it. However, the 
only relevant "error" regarding due process in this appeal is the trial court's failure to 
consider whether it sent notice to Respondent in time for her to have the five-day notice 
required by Rule 6(d) for due process. Infra at 7, 9. 
attended the hearing" (Brief of Appellee, pp. 11-12 (emphasis added)). Furthermore, 
Petitioner claims, "any procedural defect was harmless since Respondent was completely 
heard on the issues before the trial court." (Brief of Appellee, p. 12)15 
Petitioner's argument is logically flawed and against sound policy. He essentially 
argues that there can be no due process violation for insufficient notice if a party later 
exercises her right to object to what happened at the hearing for which she received 
insufficient notice. Adopting this line of reasoning, a party who receives insufficient 
notice cannot object to the resultant holding against her without ipso facto eviscerating 
her due process claim. Obviously our justice system would cave in upon itself with this 
circular exercise of "justice." 
Lastly, Petitioner claims that the Respondent "must not have felt that the trial court 
issued entry of default without proper notice" in that she did not "move to set aside the 
entry of default as provided for in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c)" (Brief of 
Appelle, p. 12). Petitioner misunderstands the nature of Rule 55(c), which on its face 
provides guidance forjudges as to when they may set aside an entry of default and an 
entry of default judgment. Rule 55(c) states in its entirety: For good cause shown the 
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, 
may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). Utah R. Civ. Pro. 55(c). 
Respondent cannot help but wonder if Petitioner would be so eager to characterize his 
own constitutionally protected opportunity to be heard in the same manner if it were his 
due process rights at issue. 
15 
Respondent properly filed a motion for the trial court to set aside its default 
judgment against her pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and (6)'s requirements (See Brief pp. 
22-25 & fn 4, 38, 48). On its face Rule 55(c) does not require that she demonstrate the 
sincerity of her Rule 60(b) Motion by also filing a Motion to Set Aside Default, nor does 
it require that she file a Motion to Set Aside as a prerequisite for the trial court to have 
taken seriously the filing of her 60(b) motion. 
B. Alleged Fraud, Mistake, Excusable Neglect, Limited Findings Of Facts, 
And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Do Not Justify Relief, 
Petitioner argues that all of the Respondent's remaining claims do not justify 
relief. The Respondent addresses Petitioner's arguments individually below. 
1) "Alleged Fraud" 
Petitioner dismisses the court's failure to adequately address Respondent's 
allegations of fraud by arguing that "any alleged fraud by the [Petitioner], either upon the 
court or on the [Respondent] herself does not change the fact that she was ordered to 
provide the discovery, and failed to do so" (Brief of Appellee, p. 13). Petitioner's 
argument is again flawed and against sound policy. Petitioner essentially argues that 
because Respondent failed to provide discovery and did not attend the hearing fraud was 
ipso facto irrelevant for the trial court to adequately consider before it denied 
Respondent's 60(b) motion, even though fraud is specifically mentioned in 60(b)(3) as a 
basis upon which a court may set aside a default decree. 
Respondent's claim of fraud pertaining to the Petitioner's fraudulent 
misrepresentations at the Evidentiary Hearing was relevant for the court to consider 
before denying the Respondent relief in that if she proved her claim she would show that 
awards given the Petitioner in the trial court's Findings of Facts were fraudulently 
induced by his misrepresentations (See Brief, pp. 46-47). It was also relevant for the court 
to consider because allowing a fraudulent award to stand would be an obvious mockery 
ofjustice. 
Respondent's claim of fraud pertaining to Petitioner's fraudulent 
misrepresentation of his intent to enter a stipulation was relevant for the court to consider 
in that it was exactly directed at lulling the Petitioner into not taking appropriate action so 
that Petitioner could thereby fraudulently obtain a default judgment (See Brief, 44-46 
including fns 43, 44, 45, 46). 47). Petitioner understood Respondent's vulnerability at the 
June 4 Discovery Conference and heard the judge's warning that he would 'take 
affirmative action" against her if she failed to comply with his June 24th deadline in 
complying with discovery. (R. 75; Brief of Petitioner 14 lf30) Petitioner knew that 
Respondent was uneducated and did not understand legal concerns (R. 162 ^|50; See also 
Brief 19 T|48) and would not understand the danger before her without legal counsel. 
Armed with the knowledge above, Petitioner strategized to keep the Respondent 
oblivious to her peril. 
After the June 4th, 2004 Discovery Conference Petitioner was suddenly less 
adversarial and agreed to negotiate a stipulation with the Respondent (R. 159 ^ f 33; R. 180 
f 26; See also Brief, p. 14 ^ f 31). He led the Respondent to believe all the way to the end 
of June that they were closer and closer to an agreement and then in July sent her a 
stipulated agreement drafted by his attorney for her to sign (Brief, p. 14-15 fflf 31, 32; R. 
17 
159 at f 34; R. 180 Tf 26,27; R. 227 f 13; See also Brief, p. 15). Petitioner then told the 
Respondent to take the divorce class before sending the stipulation, notarized, to his 
attorney for him to sign. Respondent did so following the carrot Petitioner held in front of 
her of an amicable ending to their marriage (Brief, p. 15 fflf 34, 35; Respondent's 
Memorandum, R. 159 flf 36, 37, 38; R. 1801f 27; R. 1811flj 29, 30). 
In August after sending the signed stipulation to Petitioner's attorney as well as a 
certification that she completed the divorce education class, Petitioner assured 
Respondent it was just a matter of waiting for his attorney to deliver the stipulation to 
him (See Brief, pp. 15-16; Respondent's Memorandum, 159fflf 38, 39, 40; R 181 fflf 30, 
31, 32; He continued to feign assurance all of the way up until he filed a motion for and 
obtained default judgment against her.(Id; Brief, pp. 16-18 f^ f 39, 40,43, 44; Motion for 
Default and Evidentiary Hearing, R. 83-86; Request to Submit for Decision, R. 87-89; R. 
Notice of Evidentiary Hearing, 90-91; Respondent's Memorandum, R. 160 ^ f 142; Minute 
Entry, R. 92). Only then did he end his false assurances and reveal his true adversarial 
intentions toward her (Brief pp. 18-19 Tf 45; Respondent's Memorandum, R 160 at Tf 46; 
R 181 Tf 34; Affidavit of Petitioner, R 224-229; R. 181 ^ 34). However, the trial court 
took the Petitioner's presence at the Evidentiary Hearing and the Respondent's failure to 
show with stipulation in hand (just as Petitioner calculated) as conclusive evidence of 
Petitioner's innocence without appropriate inquiry into Respondent's claim of fraud 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). (See discussion of the trial court's reasoning Infra at 6-7). 
Petitioner further argues that negotiations over stipulated divorce terms did not 
affect Respondent's duty to comply with a court order.(Brief of Appellee at 14). 
However, Petitioner misses the point that Respondent offered evidence in Respondent's 
Memorandum that those very "negotiations" were calculated to appease Respondent and 
lead her to not take the measures she needed to take to protect herself, such as finding an 
attorney to help her understand the request in order to comply (See Infra at 16-17). 
2. Mistake and Excusable Neglect 
As part of her claim of mistake in her Rule 60(b) Motion the Respondent said she 
was unaware of receiving Notice of Evidentiary Hearing and other notices pertaining to it 
(R. 160 TJ44; R. 182 \ 35). Petitioner, however, claims that she must have received notice 
because the trial judge found that she had received notice (Brief of Appellee, p. 13). In so 
doing Petitioner circularly elevates our judicial system at the trial level to that of final 
appeal and overstates the broad deference granted a trial court as fact finder upon 
appellate review. 
Deference is granted the trial court only where the court's findings are based upon 
adequate findings of fact. Woodward, supra, at 478 |^4-5 (deference granted only where 
findings of fact are "sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis of the court's 
decision); Alfred v. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). Here, even though 
Respondent claimed mistake and excusable neglect as explicitly provided for in a Rule 
60(b) Motion, the trial court did not enter any findings of fact regarding her claim (See 
Ruling, R. 247-248; Respondent's Memorandum, R. 166-168).16 Therefore this Court 
should grant no deference to the trial court's finding. 
16
 While the court did address one part of her claim, notice, it ignored whether she was 
aware of having received it and elevated actual receipt of notice to the "primary factual 
19 
Petitioner also argues under mistake and excusable neglect that the trial court 
"basically" found that if the Respondent was confused or didn't understand the law she 
should have asked the Court for help (Brief of Appellee at 14). However, the "finding" to 
which the Petitioner refers was in the lower court's Ruling on Respondent's Objection 
(R. 112-121, ^3), not in its Ruling regarding Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion (R. 247-
248; Brief Exhibit "F"). Thus it is not applicable to the trial court's denial of 
Respondent's 60(b) motion. Even if it were applicable (see infra at 5-6) the "finding" 
presupposes the effect of lack of education, legal training, confusion, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and whether Respondent's perception of the trial court was as a 
threat or as an advocate, to be such that it left Respondent confident she could come to 
the court with questions and that she would understand the court's answers. 
3. Limited Findings of Fact 
Petitioner claims it is clear that all of the facts the trial court failed to consider and 
arguably even notice in Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion the default decree of divorce are 
irrelevant to this case and would be so even if the court had considered them, because the 
"real issue" is whether the trial court could issue a default divorce decree as a sanction for 
discovery (Brief of Appellee, p. 14). Again, the scope of this appellate review does not 
include the correctness of the trial court issuing a default divorce decree as a sanction but 
whether, in light of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances that Respondent 
brought before the trial court in its 60(b) motion, the trial court abused its discretion by 
dispute" in the entire case, never considering it in the context in which it was offered. See 
also discussion infra, at 2-6; Brief, pp. 38-40. 
not adequately considering evidence set forth in Respondent's 60(b) motion before it 
denied relief17 
The trial court utterly failed to make adequate findings of fact in regard to 
Respondent's claims under 60(b) of mistake and excusable neglect (See infra at 2-3, 4-6; 
Brief at 36-43, and Exhibit "F"; Ruling, R. 247-248; Respondent's Memorandum, 
R.163-172), fraud (See infra at 5-6; 15-18; Brief at 36-37, 43-47 and Exhibit "F"; R. 247-
248), and ineffective assistance of counsel (See infra at 6; Brief at 36-37, 48-49, and 
Exhibit "F"; Ruling, R. 247-248) Further, the trial court made only very limited findings 
of fact regarding Respondent's notice of the proceeding and opportunity to appear and 
have counsel present at the Evidentiary Hearing ( See infra at 2-4; Brief at 36-37; Ruling, 
R. 247-248), leaving this Court without an adequate basis on which to determine whether 
its denial of the Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion the divorce decree was adequate and 
proper in light of all of the grounds Respondent raised for the court to do so.18 
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 
Petitioner argues that because Respondent was not represented by her former 
counsel at the time of the evidentiary hearing and the June 24th deadline for compliance 
with discovery, the ineffective assistance by her former counsel is irrelevant (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 13) Again, the issue before this court is not whether Ineffective Assistance 
See discussion of this, infra at 7-8. 
18
 The Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion named 5 different errors (including two errors of 
fraud) for the trial court to consider in determining whether to give relief from the default 
judgment awarded against her. R. 96-101. 
21 
by Counsel actually affected the Respondent's failure to comply with discovery, but 
whether the trial court made adequate findings of fact regarding the evidence and 
arguments pertaining to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by the Respondent in its 60(b) 
Rule 60(b) Motion before it denied Respondent relief {See infra at 7-8). 
Even if the issue on appeal were as Petitioner claims, his conclusion assumes the 
effect of ineffective assistance to be neatly contained only within the actual period of 
representation. However the effects of former counsel's ineffective assistance reached all 
of the way into the Evidentiary Hearing and issuance of default. For example, it started a 
history of noncompliance that did not represent Respondent's desire or efforts to comply 
as well as an inappropriate negative adversarial-type relationship between Respondent 
and her counsel that was very unhelpful and could not have infused in Respondent 
confidence that her smartest next move after his negligence and desertion in the midst of 
discovery demands would be to find new counsel. 
4. "APPELLANT'S EXHIBIT "G" SHOULD BE STRUCK" 
Petitioner asks this Court at the appellate level to strike the transcript of the 
Evidentiary Hearing to which Petitioner failed to object at the trial level and which now 
has become part of the Court Record on appeal. (Brief of Appellee, p. 15; see also 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion Decree of 
Divorce at R. 191-196 (transcript included); Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion Decree of Divorce, R. 219-
223(Petitioner makes absolutely no reference to the transcript). A party may not move 
for the first time to strike evidence on appeal that they did not object to at the trial level. 
See e.g. D&L Supply v. Saurini, 115 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989).20 
Even if he could move to strike for the first time on appeal, Petitioner's arguments 
fail. First, there was no court reporter present at the hearing but a tape recording of the 
hearing was available. (Minutes of the Evidentiary Hearing R. 92 (Tape dc-cd-30, Tape 
count 10:17). It was from this tape that the unofficial transcription was made. Next, it is 
very telling that Petitioner, who was present at the hearing, did not object to the transcript 
or its accuracy in his replies to Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion or her Motion for 
Summary Disposition and even now does not allege that any material or even a minor 
evidentiary portion of the transcript is erroneous, but instead claims only a possible 
transcription error where Petitioner's counsel is referred to as "Mr. Moody. 
Finally, Petitioner erroneously claims that Respondent somehow "certified" 
pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1) that no transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing was required. The 
certificate to which he refers was not regarding the Evidentiary Hearing but rather 
regarding the trial court's denial of Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion. The reason 
Respondent filed this certification is that the trial court did not hold a hearing before he 
denied Respondent's motion and thus there was no transcript to request. See Utah R. 
19
 The Transcript was also served upon Petitioner in Exhibit "C" of Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Disposition. An objection to it there at that time is also conspicuously 
absent in Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Disposition as well as in his Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities In 
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. 
20
 Respondent has also addressed Petitioner's claim in detail in Brief, p. 31 fn 19. 
23 
App. P. 11(e) (1); Certification That Transcript is Not Required, R. 254. See also Utah 
Court of Appeals letter to Respondent's counsel, R. 253. 
5. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Petitioner asks this Court to award attorney's fees because [Petitioner] 
prevailed below" (Brief of Appellee, p. 15). While this Court may award costs on appeal 
to the party who also received an award of attorney's fees below (Pack v. Case, 2001 30 
P.3d 436, 426; certiorari denied 40 P.3d 1135), this award is optional (Ut, R. of App. P. 
34(a)) and should be denied here where Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to 
"support the award." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) ("The 
party requesting the award has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to support the 
award"). "[Sufficient evidence should include the hours spent on the case, hourly rate 
charged for those hours, and the usual and customary rates for such work." (Id. at 893). 
There is no such detail regarding attorney's fees on record. (See Decree of 
Divorce, R. 132-140 f 25; Findings of Fact &Conclusions of Law, R. 122-131130; 
Respondent's Objection, R. 100 Tf 8; See also Ruling on Respondent's Objection, R. 121 
% 8). Therefore this Court should not award appeal costs based on the award of attorney's 
fees below, and should instead set aside the award at the trial level. Further the 
Respondent requests that upon reversal21 costs to bring this appeal be "taxed against the 
appellee" as per Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
21
 See Respondent's argument in Brief that the most appropriate and efficient action for 
this Court to take is to reverse the trial court's ruling denying Respondent's Rule 60(b) 
Motion and order a new hearing on Respondent's motion or vacate the lower court's 
ruling and grant Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion in the alternative. Brief, p. 36 at fn 26. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's appeal sets forth four claims from her Rule 60(b) Motion plus her 
claim on appeal that the lower court failed to make adequate findings before denying her 
Rule 60(b) Motion. The trial court's findings lack sufficient detail to "adduce" whether 
the evidence upon which it based its findings supports its denial of the Rule 60(b) 
Motion. Its findings fail to address evidence regarding Respondent's claims, misapply the 
evidence to an unrelated claim, miss the basis of Respondent's claim altogether, or 
contains sparse findings that address only a minor part of one of Respondent's claims. 
Therefore the Respondent was released from the obligation she had to marshal the 
evidence and could argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings instead. 
The court's final finding regarding notice was unrelated as framed to any claim in 
Respondent's motion, yet the court based its entire denial on it. The trial court and 
Petitioner have almost completely missed the mark of Respondent's 60(b) Motion. For 
the above stated reasons and those previously filed in her Brief this court could remand 
for further findings but should, based on the court's manifest error in ignoring the 
Respondent's due process issue, reverse as a matter of law and order a new hearing or in 
the alternative vacate the trial court's ruling and grant Respondent's 60(b) Motion. 
Attorney's fees granted should be vacated with costs of appeal to the Respondent. 
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